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 Differentiated Demand and Supply of Wheat under Alternative European Trade 
Policies 
Abstract: This paper proposes a partial equilibrium displacement model that differentiates wheat 
according to its end-use and country of origin to investigate the impact of alternative European trade 
policies on wheat supply and demand in France.  Transmission, demand and supply elasticities are 
estimated for each class and origin of wheat.  Simulation results show that rebalancing trade protection 
across wheat classes encourages domestic supply of high quality wheat and displaces imports from 
North America. 
Keywords:  Differentiated wheat, almost ideal demand system, partial equilibrium displacement 
model, common agricultural policy, European Union 
For the first time since the highly protective Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) inception, the 
European Union (EU) turned from a net exporter into a net importer of common wheat by the end of 
2001.  The lower harvest of common wheat through most of the EU because of climatic problems is not 
the only reason.  A much fiercer competition from outside the EU, particularly from the United States 
(US) and from the Common Independent States (CIS) that exported large volumes of soft wheat into 
the EU, is the more fundamental reason.  This outside competition is most likely to keep its pressure on 
the EU wheat market even when the European wheat harvest will recover as expected in the next 2002-
03 season.  The EU wheat market has indeed become much more open to imports since the intervention 
price and, hence, the duty-paid entry price for cereal imports have fallen with the full implementation 
of Agenda 2000 following the 1992 reform on the cereal common market organization (CMO) and the 
extra duty on grain deliveries from the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea has been 
eliminated.  The EU duty-paid entry price for cereal imports is now below the CIF world price of North 
American high value wheat, eliminating market protection for top-grade milling and durum wheat, and 
is coming close to the North American medium-grade wheat (Figures 1 and 2).  The EU wheat sub-
sector is now irreversibly more closely linked with the rest of the world since the 1992 CAP reform, 
particularly in 2001 (Figure 3). 
Because the EU market access differs according to wheat grade but, more fundamentally, because 
demand for wheat differs according to end use and country of origin (Veeman 1987, Larue 1991) and 
supply conditions may vary according to end use, any wheat trade model to investigate the effects of 
the greater openness of the EU wheat sub-sector needs to be built on differentiated demand and supply 
of wheat.  Accordingly, a partial equilibrium displacement model (PEDM) that differentiates wheat 
according to its end use and origin is built using transmission, demand and supply elasticities estimated 
under explicitly stated product differentiation hypothesis.  To avoid the strong separability and 
homotheticity restrictions among origins implied by the Armington framework, the demand elasticities 
are estimated with an almost ideal demand system (AIDS) specification to differentiate wheat demand 
according to its end use and origin (Alston, Carter, Green and Pick, 1990).  The supply elasticities as 
well as the EU institutional and world price transmission elasticities are estimated according to end 
use.  The built-on differentiated PEDM is then used to simulate alternative EU trade protection 
focusing on the trade, demand and supply effects of replacing the current duty-paid entry price system 
by a standard ad valorem and specific import duty in line with the general World Trade Organization 
(WTO) border protection principle.  This non-discriminative form of wheat protection is expected to 
rebalance imports of wheat from higher to lower grades and encourage European producers to shift 
  2their production towards wheat of higher grades.  Because of data availability, this model is confined to 
the French wheat market for which demand and supply could be disaggregated by end uses and sources 
of supply. 






































































































EU threshold DNS CIF HRW FOB SRW FOB
 
a All prices are in nominal French francs with 6,56 FF = 1 Euro = US $0,876. 
Source: ONIC database 
Figure 2.  World prices of US and Canadian durum wheat and EU threshold wheat price from 



































EU threshold US HAD CIF CAN CWAD CIF
 a All prices are in nominal French francs with 6,56 FF = 1 Euro = US $0,876. 
Source: ONIC database 
 
















































































































 Note: Figures for 2001 are estimated by ONIC 
Source: ONIC database 
In addition to durum wheat for pasta and semolina use, the French cereal professional organization 
ONIC distinguishes four classes of common wheat based on biophysical characteristics (Table 1).  
These four classes of wheat include class Elite, 1, 2 and 3 and end up in different industries, i.e., bread 
flour, starch, biscuit and feed industries.  As Table 1 indicates, these ONIC wheat classes compete 
against their substitutes from the US and Canada, particularly for durum and hard wheat, but also from 
other UE countries, particularly durum and high protein level wheat from Italy and Germany 
respectively.
1  French wheat users differentiate wheat according to these different biophysical 
characteristics or end uses and different countries of origin, and pay different prices.  Prices of French 
wheat classes are taken from records in specialized markets, for example, Eure et Loire for class 1, 
Rouen for class 2 and Champagne for class 3.  Prices of US and Canadian wheat classes come from the 
US Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and the International Grain 
Commission (IGC).  Prices of other EU countries wheat classes are drawn from their trade unit values 
calculated from the COMEXT database considering that EU countries specialize into imports or 
exports of one specific wheat class, for example Germany in exports of wheat of class 1 and Italy in 
exports of durum wheat.  Quantities of production, imports, use and exports by wheat class from 1980 
to 2000 are reported in figures 4 to 7.  They are obtained from Mahé and Chabe-Ferret (2001) who 
recoup different information from different sources including surveys on industrial uses and area 
planted in specific wheat varieties and expert intelligence on imports and exports. 
 
                                                 
1 Competition against wheat from Australia and Argentine are negligible in the French market. 
  5This paper is organized as follow.  Price transmission, demand and supply elasticities are first 
estimated from systems differentiating wheat according to class and origin.  The PEDM is then 
structured and used to simulate alternative trade policies. Results are discussed and conclusions made. 
Table 1. Representative categories of wheat in France, the United-States and Canada 
     Hard  Soft  Feed 
   Durum  Spring  Winter  Winter  White  Wheat 
Country           
France   Durum  Elite  (E)  1 
a  2 
b 2 
b  3 
c 
USA    HAD  DNS, HRS HRW  SRW WW   
Canada    CWAD  CWRS CWRW  CESRW CEWW   
Reference variety   CWAD  DNS HRW  SRW    Maize 
d 
Criterion              
Protein    ≥13%  ≥13%  11-13%  10-11% 10.5-11.5%  <10.5% 
W 
e     ≥300  ≥160  ≥130  ≥130  - 
Hagberg 
f      ≥220  ≥220  ≥180  ≥180  - 
Use              
Pasta              
Milling              
Starch industry              
Biscuit factory and other 
uses 
            
Quality 
g    Durum  High Medium  Low Low  Feed 
a Also referred to as Superior Bread Making Wheat 
b Also referred to as Common Bread Making Wheat 
c Also referred to as Other Usage Wheat 
d FOB Rouen and FOB London 
e W (bread-making strength) measured in 10
-4 joules 
f Hagberg measured in seconds 
g According to Larue (1991) 










































































































Durum Class E Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
 Source: Mahé et Chabe-Ferret, 2001 









































































































Durum Class E Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
 Source: Mahé et Chabe-Ferret, 2001 













































































































Durum Class E Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
 Source: Mahé et Chabe-Ferret, 2001 













































































































Durum Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
 Source: Mahé et Chabe-Ferret, 2001 
  8Institutional and World Price Transmissions 
Since wheat market prices in the EU fluctuate between the intervention and the duty-paid entry prices 
according to market conditions and the setting of these two institutional prices could be affected by 
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where  k  represents the country, i the wheat class,  j  the country of origin, which in this equation is 
the same as k , and  the time index.  The price   is the domestic market price,   the end of period 
stocks,   and   the institutional intervention and duty-paid entry prices, and   the world price.  
The variable   represents net extra-European exports.  The function   is a 
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corresponding to a deficit situation where the duty-paid entry price is the market-directing price and a 
value of  1 = L  corresponding to a surplus situation where the intervention price is the market-directing 
price.  From the corresponding transmission coefficients γ, transmission elasticities are calculated for 
1999 as follows. 
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= with  1999 = t . 
Table 2 shows the resulting transmission elasticities.  As expected, transmission elasticities of the 
institutional variables are larger for the lower quality wheat class 3 than for the higher quality wheat 
classes 1 and 2 since these high quality classes are more subject to market forces.  Institutional price 
transmission elasticities are null for rapeseed and sunflower since institutional price were eliminated in 
1992 while world price transmission elasticities are higher for these oilseeds as well as for soy meal 
than for the other products for the same reason.  All these transmission elasticities are significant at 5% 
except for wheat class 1 and protein crops while the world price transmission elasticities are significant 
  9at 5% only for the substitute and competing products. 
Table 2. Institutional and world price transmission elasticities in 1999 
    Wheat class  Substitute / competing product 
Short term elasticity    Durum  E  1  2  3  Maize Rapeseed Sunflower Protein crops  Wheat bran Soy meal
Institutional price    0.67 1.13  0.68  0.68 0.86 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.73 
a 0.56 
a -  
World price    0.12 0.02  0.07  0.15 0.10 0.17 0.30 0.59 0.39   -   1.05
a Price elasticity with respect to class 3 wheat 
Source: Original estimations available upon request from the authors 
 
Demand of Durum and Wheat Classes E, 1, 2 and 3 
Because of the low substitution between durum, milling and feed wheat, weak separability is assumed 
among demands of these three wheat categories.  The estimation of the demands for milling wheat 
classes by country of origin follows a three-stage budgeting procedure as illustrated in figure 8 while 
the estimation of the demands for durum wheat by origin follows a two-stage budgeting procedure.  
Weak separability hypothesis implied by these multi-stage budgeting procedures are not rejected using 
a Rotterdam specification in a submitted accompanying paper to this congress.  In the last stage, the 
change in demand   for a specific wheat class i from a specific country of origin k
ijt D j  in country  in 
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where   denotes the set of indexes of wheat class iof all origins l  demanded in country   
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k
ij µ are the price and expenditure elasticities of demand respectively. 
For the durum and milling wheat classes, the conditional demand elasticities are estimated within the 
multi-stage budgeting scheme with the AIDS model.  Widely used in various demand and import 
demand studies (De Gorter and Meilke 1987, Moschini, Moro and Green 1994, Moschini 1996, 
Mohanty and Peterson 1999), the AIDS model has several advantages: (i) its flexibility which enables a 
quasi exact representation of consumer preferences at least at a given point in contrast, for example, to 
the Rotterdam model, (ii) the eventual direct use of its estimates to test for the theoretical conditions 
imposed on demand equations (i.e., adding up, symmetry, homogeneity and concavity restrictions), and 
(iii) a resulting non linear Engle curve which allows for income elasticity to vary according to income 
levels.  The AIDS model has the additional advantage of not imposing the Armington restrictions of 
homotheticity and separability among demands in the last stage. 
In the AIDS model, the budget share budget w of demand from country  of a product i 










j is specified as follows: 
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where P  is a general price deflator specified as follows: 
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Following Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), the general price deflator can be approximated by the Stone 
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The adding up, homogeneity and symmetry conditions respectively require that: 
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ilj ijl γ γ = .  The negativity condition is verified if 


































The estimation of the derived demands for feed wheat and its substitutes is obtained from a translog 
profit function. 
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 with i i n ..., , 1 , = ′  
where  is a vector of profit share of   ,   is a vector of fixed factors, and   is a vector of all input 
and output prices of the system. 
i s i f z i p ′
The homogeneity conditions with respect to both prices and fixed factors require that: 
i i i i ′ ′ = β β ,  ,  ,    ∑ =
i









The derived demand system distinguishes four feed substitutes as illustrated in figure 9.  In a third 
stage budgeting scheme, the demand for the feed wheat class is differentiated according to the country 
of origin with the AIDS specification.  Unconditional feed demand elasticities could be obtained from 
  12using a two-stage profit maximization approach as presented in Davis and Jensen (1994) but are not 
estimated here since the supply of feed substitutes is mainly domestic with the exception of soy meal.  
Because of lack of degree of freedom, no other variable input price and fixed factor are add to the 
demand system, a potential candidate for fixed factor being the herd size. 














The demand systems are estimated using the non-linear least square (NLSQ) method with the usual 
theoretical restrictions (i.e., homogeneity, symmetry, concavity and negativity).  Negativity is imposed 
by using the Cholesky decomposition suggested by Diewart and Wales (1987).  Since both the AIDS 
and translog models are expressed in shares, one of the equations of each demand system is dropped to 
avoid singularity.  The homogeneity constraint allows the recovery of the missing estimates.  Each 
system is also corrected for autocorrelation by using the same autocorrelation coefficient for each 
equation as suggested by Berndt and Savin (1975). 





w β γ λ − + − =     1  ,  il
ij
ijl




β µ + =1  




  13The derived demand elasticities for the feed wheat and its substitutes are calculated as follows: 
i
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=− + + 1  for the own-price elasticities. 
 
Most of the third-stage demand elasticities reported in Table 3 are significant at 5%.  With the expected 
negative sign, the own-price elasticities are superior to unity as expected for differentiated product.  
Most of the cross-price elasticities have the expected positive sign.  Substitution is particularly high 
between durum wheat from France and the rest of the world (i.e., Canada and the US), between class E 
wheat from the US and Canada and between class E from the rest of the EU and Canada.  Most of the 
expenditure elasticities have the expected positive sign and are equal or superior to unity.  Notice that 
expenditure elasticities for durum wheat are similar for the three origins and that expenditure 
elasticities are particularly high for class E wheat from France and for class 1 wheat from the US.  That 
these elasticities are generally higher than those found in Mohanty and Peterson (1999), is not 
surprising since wheat classes add here an additional level of differentiation. 
About half of the second-stage elasticities of demand for feed wheat and its substitutes reported in 
Table 4 are significant at 5%.  As expected, all the own-price elasticities are negative.  The cross-price 
elasticities that are significant are positive and, not surprisingly, particularly high between feed wheat 
and maize and between feed wheat and protein crops.  Curiously, there is no substitution between 
protein crops and soy meal. 
Supply of Durum and Wheat Classes E, 1, 2 and 3  
Following Moro and Sckokai (1999), the supply model considers that the supply of a wheat class 
responds to its own and competing crop prices, direct payment, own and competing crop acreage, and 
other fixed factors.  Accordingly, the change in supply O  of a specific wheat class   in competition 
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where   is the direct acreage payment defined as  k
















with   the per hectare specific 
direct payment for crop  ,   the set-aside payment and   the fixed set-aside percentage, and   is 
the level of the fixed factors of production.  This supply specification allows for adjusting supply 
responses to the additional acreage response from the direct acreage payments progressively 





ξ ,  ' ii ζ  and  ' ii τ  are the elasticities of prices, direct 
acreage payments and fixed factors of production respectively. 
 
  14Table 3. Third stage uncompensated demand elasticities by wheat class and origin in 1999 in 
France 
a 
   Origin   
     European   United-    Rest of   
Wheat class  Origin  France  Union  States  Canada  world  Expenditure 
Durum    


























Class E   








   1.94*** 
(0.06) 










  -0.74*** 
(0.28) 








   0.63*** 
(0.03) 








   0.87* 
(0.48) 
Class 1   






   1.02*** 
(0.01) 








   0.06 
(0.50) 






   4.12*** 
(1.42) 
Class 2   






    1.00
*** 
(0.00) 








    0.71
*** 
(0.00) 
Class 3   





    1.01
*** 
(0.00) 








   -0.57
* 
(0.09) 
a Standard errors in parentheses; 
***: significant at 1%, 
**: significant at 5%, 
*: significant at 10%. 
Source: Original estimations available upon request from the authors 
 
  15Table 4. Second stage uncompensated feed wheat and substitute demand elasticities in 1999 in 
France 
a 
Product  Class 3 wheat  Maize  Wheat bran  Protein crop  Soy meal 


















































a Standard errors in parentheses; 
***: significant at 1%, 
**: significant at 5%, 
*: significant at 10%. 
Source: Original estimations available upon request from the authors 
Supply elasticities are first calculated from the estimation of a supply obtained from a normalized 
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where   pit
k
′  is the normalized product or input price, 
  rit ′  is the direct acreage payment to production, 
  ν ′ it is a fixed factor of production. 
Because of the poor results obtained with this specification, a general dynamic specification is used 
following the Wickens and Breuch (1988) procedure: 






























































 is the long term coefficient, 
  is the difference operator,  ∆
  δ ′ i  is the vector of parameters in the static normalized quadratic supply system. 
The final estimated supply system includes one lag on market prices and quantities only since expected 
direct acreage payments are known.  Because of insufficient data on variable inputs and some fixed 
factors of production, only product prices and direct acreage payments are included in the supply 
system.  Because of insufficient degrees of freedom, competing crops to durum wheat are limited to 
maize and sunflowers and those to common wheat limited to rapeseed and protein crops.  In addition to 
this lack of degrees of freedom, multicollinearity problems among market wheat class prices impede to 
estimate simultaneously one single supply system made up of the four wheat classes and their 
competing products.  The five individual systems are estimated separately.  In the supply systems for 
the common wheat classes, prices and direct payments are normalized with the protein crop price, 
while in the supply system for durum wheat, they are normalized with the sunflower price. 
The supply systems are estimated using the least square method with the usual theoretical restrictions 
  16(i.e., homogeneity, symmetry and convexity).  Convexity is imposed by using the Cholesky 
decomposition.  Elasticities are calculated for year 1998, simply by differentiating the supply equations 
with respect to prices and direct acreage payments. 
Because the original estimated price elasticities of supply are particularly low for wheat classes 2 and 
3, they are multiplied by 10 in Table 5.  Similarly, because the original estimated direct payment 
elasticities of supply are particularly high for durum wheat, they are divided by 5 in Table 5.  Standard 
errors are not reported for these adjusted elasticities.  Even with this ad hoc adjustment, the supply 
elasticities associated to the direct acreage payments stay high relatively to those associated to prices.  
Otherwise, own-price and direct payment elasticities of supply are always positive but not always 
significantly.  Most of the cross-price and direct payment elasticities of supply are significantly 
negative as expected. 
Table 5. Adjusted supply elasticities in 1999 in France 
a 
  Price  Acreage payment 
      Protein           Protein      
Wheat class  Wheat  Rapeseed  crop  Maize Sunflower  Wheat  Rapeseed  crop  Maize  Sunflower 
Durum   0.95*** 
(0.05) 

















































a Standard errors in parentheses; 
***: significant at 1%, 
**: significant at 5%, 
*: significant at 10%. 
Source: Original estimations available upon request from the authors 
The Partial Equilibrium Displacement Model and Policy Scenarios 
The complete partial equilibrium displacement model distinguishing wheat according to class and 
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The variable  represents here the excess domestic supply over domestic demand and exports to the 
rest of the EU by wheat class at period  .  The excess domestic supply as well as the excess domestic 




  17elasticity  and the policy variable POL but not through the world price transmission elasticities 
since world prices are kept exogenous.  This model is solved recursively starting with an initial value 
of  and  taken at t and ending with complete convergence of the values of the excess 
domestic supply and institutional price elasticities.  At this stage of the analysis, changes in expenditure 




it XN ikt3 ε 1999 =
Table 6 shows the policy scenarios that are simulated.  The first scenario corresponds to the 
implementation of Agenda 2000 on the 1999 data set. Cereal intervention prices are cut while their 
direct acreage payments are increased and set-aside payments are reduced.  The second and third sets 
of scenarios replace the cereal duty-paid entry price based on the 155% cereal intervention price as 
agreed at the final stage of the Uruguay Round negotiations, by three levels of ad valorem and specific 
import taxes respectively.  A last scenario is the appreciation of 10% of the Euro against the US dollar, 
which is translated into a reduction of 10% in CIF.  All scenarios keep the provisions of Agenda 2000 
and are assessed against the EU market access and export competition provisions agreed to in the 
Agricultural Agreement of the Uruguay Round (AAUR) are translated into French trade constraints in 
proportion to the 1986-88 average French wheat consumption and export shares respectively. 
Table 6. Simulation scenarios 
  Policy Scenarios 
   ad  valorem  specific 
Instruments  Agenda 2000  import tax  import tax 
Cereal intervention price   -15%  -15%  -15% 
Cereal reference or entry price   lower than 155% the 
intervention price 
110, 120 et 130% the 
CIF price 
100, 250 et 375 FF/ton on 
the CIF price 
Average specific direct payment per hectare:      
Wheat and maize  +16%  +16%  +16% 
Rapeseed and sunflower  -33%  -33%  -33% 
Protein crops  -8%  -8%  -8% 
Set aside premium  -8%  -8%  -8% 
Effective set aside rate  -17%  -17%  -17% 
Simulation Results and Interpretation 
Tables 7 to 9 show the effects of these different scenarios on domestic demands by wheat class and 
origin, domestic supplies by wheat class and exports by wheat class.  Without going into details 
because of space limitation, we observe that Agenda 2000 increases domestic demands of all classes of 
wheat (Table 7).  These increases in domestic demands are met by: 
•  an increase in French imports of wheat of higher quality classes (i.e., durum and classes E and 1) 
from the rest of the world and French imports of wheat of lower quality classes (i.e., classes 2 and 
3) from the rest of the EU (Table 7), 
•  an increase in domestic supply of wheat of higher quality classes (i.e., durum and classes E and 1) 
to the detriment to wheat of lower quality classes (i.e., classes 2 and 3) (Table 8), 
•  a dramatic decrease in French exports of wheat, particularly of classes E et 3 (Table 9). 
Market access and export competition provisions agreed to in the AAUR are met since French imports 
  18from the rest of the world increase by 17%, the volume of subsidized exports decreases by 12% and the 
value of export subsidies by 58% (Tables 7 and 9). 
Increasing ad valorem or specific import taxes instead of an duty-paid entry price based on the 155% 
cereal intervention price encourage even more domestic supply of wheat of higher quality classes (i.e., 
durum and classes E and 1) to the detriment to wheat of lower quality classes (i.e., classes 2 and 3) 
(Table 8).  This import tax scheme is, however, detrimental to French imports of durum wheat from the 
rest of the world but slightly increases French imports of common wheat from the rest of the world 
(Table 7).  This import tax scheme facilitates French exports of durum wheat and common wheat of 
class E but discourages French exports of common wheat of class 1 (Table 9).  With a 10% ad valorem 
tax or a 100FF/ton specific import tax, export competition provisions agreed to in the AAUR are also 
met with such schemes since the volume of subsidized exports decreases by 15% and the value of 
export subsidies by 61% (Table 9).  However, the market access provision is not met since French 
imports from the rest of the world decrease by 12% (Table 7). 
An appreciation of 10% of the Euro against the US dollar translated into a reduction of 10% in CIF 
prices reduces the French wheat net exports by 10%. 
Table 7. Demand changes by wheat class and origin (%) 
     Scenario 
         Import  tax     
Wheat     Agenda      ad valorem specific    CIF  price
Class  Origin    2000    null  10% 20% 30%  100 FF/t  250 FF/t  375 FF/t    -10% 
Durum  France   5   7   91 11 2   9 11 12    6
  Intra-EU   8   6   654   65  4     9
  Extra-EU   39   -11   -46 -80 -114   -39 -80 -115    39
  Total    7   6   666   66  6     8
Class E  France   29   27   22 15 6   23 12 0    29
  Intra-EU   -13   -21   -12 -3 5   -13 -1 9    -13
  United States   -1   22   -1 -20 -36   4 -25 -43    -1
  Canada   22   13   19 22 23   18 23 22    23
  Rest of world 
a    0   0   000   00  0     0
  Total    -1   -6   -2 0 2   -3 1 3    -1
Class 1  France   9   16   14 13 12   14 11 9    10
  Intra-EU   1   6   543   53  1     1
  United States   61   239   204 169 135   190 116 55    60
  Total    9   16   14 13 12   14 11 9    10
Class 2  France   10   11   11 11 11   11 10 10    11
  Intra-EU   7   7   777   77  7     8
  Total    10   11   11 11 11   11 10 10    11
Class 3  France   9   11   999   99  9     12
  Intra-UE   7   9   777   77  7     9
  Total    9   11   999   99  9     12
Common   France   10   12   11 11 10   11 10 9    11
Wheat  Intra-EU   -9   -14   -7 -1 5   -9 1 8    -8
Total  United States   2   32   8- 1 1- 2 8   12 -19 -39    1
  Canada   22   13   19 22 23   18 23 22    23
  Total    9   12   11 10 10   11 10 9    11
a Not included in simulations 
 
  19Table 8. Supply changes by wheat class (%) 
   Scenario 
       Import  tax   
   Agenda        ad valorem specific  CIF  price 
Wheat class    2000    null    10%  20%  30%  100 FF/t  250 FF/t  375 FF/t  -10% 
Durum    3   9   13  18  22   13  18  22   8 
Class  E    4   4   5  5  6   4  5  6   5 
Class  1    3   -1   0  0  1   0  2  3   5 
Class  2    -4   -4   -5  -5  -5   -5  -5  -5   -3 
Class  3    -3   -4   -3  -3  -3   -3  -3  -3      -1 
 
Table 9. Export changes by wheat class (%) 
   Scenario 
       Import  tax   
   Agenda        ad valorem specific  CIF  price 
Wheat class    2000    null    10%  20%  30%  100 FF/t  250 FF/t  375 FF/t  -10% 
Durum    3   10   15 20 26 14 20 26  9
Class E   -71    -65    -49 -26 5 -53 -17  24  -68
Class 1   -5    -19    -17 -14 -11 -16 -10  -5  0
Class 2    -5   -5   -6 -6 -6 -6 -5 -5  -3
Class 3   -100   -100   -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100  -100
TOTAL    -12   -15   -15 -14 -13 -14 -13 -11  -10
 
Conclusions 
Clearly, simulations of alternative wheat protection devices performed on an PEDM model that allows 
differentiation of wheat by classes and origins, show that the use of an ad valorem or specific import 
tax instead of the current ad hoc EU cereal protection agreed at the final stage of the AARU would 
encourage the supply of high quality wheat in France and displace wheat imports from the rest of the 
world.  As a result, high quality wheat exporters such as Canada and the US are not likely to easily 
accept rebalancing wheat protection across wheat classes.  For example, at a low import tax rate of 
10% or 100FF/ton, French imports of durum wheat from these two countries drop dramatically.  Since 
such rebalancing in wheat protection is likely to equally encourage supply of high quality wheat in the 
rest of the EU, particularly in Germany and Italy, imports of high quality wheat from the rest of the 
world may drop equally.  Implementation of such an import tax scheme is likely to limit EU market 
access under the EU commitments to the AAUR and, eventually, to the next WTO round. 
The results of this analysis could be enhanced by making use of a dynamic AIDS model as proposed in 
Mohanty and Peterson (1999) to estimate the demand systems and endogenizing income effects in the 
demand systems of the PEDM.  Future work on this paper will include a sensitivity analysis on key 
parameters such as demand and supply elasticities, using a stochastic partial equilibrium displacement 
model as proposed in Davis and Espinoza (2000).  Another direction of improvement will be to expand 
the model to other key EU countries such as Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and, eventually, to 
the whole EU, and to estimate and include wheat demands from CIS and Central and Eastern European 
countries in the PEDM as these two groups of countries may become more active in exporting their 
high quality wheat into the EU. 
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